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(2) The judge should be made criminally liable in cases of gross
negligence in determining the adequacy of security.55
(3) Since it is evident that the security for bail is often extremely
inadequate, an initial, separate deposit, which would be available if
the security failed to satisfy all claims against it, should be required
of the professional bondsman when he applies for a license.50
(4) All forfeited bonds should be carefully collected. 7
(5) A lien should be placed on the property which is pledged for
security. 58
(6) Amounts of bail should be less when given by a friend or
relative than if offered by a professional bondsman.
These suggested reforms are not intended to be all-inclusive but
adoption of them would greatly aid the proper administration of bail.
Until such reforms as these are adopted, the bail system as a process
of the criminal courts will continue to be inadequate.
LuT=i

HOUSE

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-LEGITIMACY SAVING STATUTESCHILDREN OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGES
The question arises whether the children of an attempted common
law marriage,1 which is void in Kentucky, have been made legitimate
by the statutes. This question, uncomplicated by other issues, has
never been decided in Kentucky since the abolition of common law
marriages in 1852.2
Three statutes are applicable. First, Section 391.100 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes seemingly legitimates the issue of common law
marriages, together with most other void marriages, by the following
language:
55 Supra note 7 at 119; A.L.I. CODE OF Cmr. P. sec. 112 (1930). This
would also be analogous to the liability of the common law. See, 2 POLLOC, AN
MATLAND, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 584 (2d Ed. 1905).

56 102 PENN. L.R. 1031, 1063 (1954).
57 See U.S. v. Field, 190 F. 2d 554 (1951), where the court jailed a surety
for refusing to give aid to the court in obtaining custody of an accused who had
absconded.
58 Supra note 56.
1 As used in this note, a common law marriage is defined as a marriage based
upon mutual consent of the parties to become husband and wife, per verba de
presenti, then and there, without any formal ceremony. An attempted common
law marriage refers to a factual situation which would raise a valid common law
marriage
in a state recognizing common law marriage.
2
Ky. Acts 1850, c. 617, p. 212, sees. 2 and 8, effective July 1, 1852.

NOTES

(1) The issue of a marriage found to be incestuous by
the conviction of the party or by the judgment of a court during the
lifetime of the parties, or of a marriage between a white person and
a negro or mulatto is not legitimate.
(2) The issue of all other illegal or void marriages is legitimate.

Further, Section 402.020 seems to include common law marriages
among the "void" marriages contemplated by the Legislature, by the
following:
Marriage is prohibited and void: (1) With an idiot or
lunatic; (2) Between a white person and a Negro or mulatto; (3)
Where there is a husband or wife living from whom the person
marrying has not been divorced; (4) When not solemnized or contracted in the presence of an authorized person or society; (5) When
at the time of marriage, the male is under sixteen or the female is
under fourteen years of age.

However, Section 406.010, on its face might be thought to make
illegitimate the issue of a common law marriage when it provides:
Any child shall be considered a bastard if: (1) It is
begotten and born out of lawful wedlock and not made legitimate
thereafter by 3recognition and marriage of its parents as provided by
KRS 391.090.

An "illegal or void" marriage is not "lawful wedlock." Thus, taken
alone, Section 406.010 would indicate that the issue of "illegal or void"
marriages could be made legitimate only by a subsequent valid marriage of the parents. Such a result, however, would render Section
891.100(2) meaningless.
This apparent conflict between Sections 406.010 and 391.100(2) is
resolved by interpreting them to supplement rather than conflict with
each other. Thus Section 406.010 applies to the situation where there
has been no marriage of any kind prior to the birth of issue. In order
to legitimate under this section, by subsequent "recognition and marriage," there must be a subsequent ceremonial marriage 4 or a common
law marriage contracted in a state where such are recognized. 5 On the
other hand, Section 391.100(2) has within its purview the situation
when before the birth of issue there has been a marriage which is
"illegal and void," but the children of which are nevertheless legitimate.6
3Ky. REv. STAT. see. 391.090(3) (1953) provides: 'If a man who has a
child by a woman afterward marries her, the childor its descendants, if recognized
by him
4 before or after marriage, shall be deemed legitimate."
Helm v. Coin, 227 Ky. 773, 14 S.W. 2d 183 (1929); Bates v. Meade, 174
Ky. 545, 192 S.W. 666 (1917).
5 Copenhaver v. Hemphill, 314 Ky. 356, 235 S.W. 2d 778 (1952).
0 Bates v. Meade, supra note 4; Harris v. Harris, 85 Ky. 49, 2 S.W. 549
(1887); Sneed v. Ewing, 5 J. J. Marsh. (28 Ky.)
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It is submitted that Section 402.020(4) must necessarily include
common law marriages when it speaks of marriages "not solemnized
or contracted", since Section 402.070 specifically validates marriages
performed by unauthorized persons or societies if entered into in good
faith by one or both parties.
We must therefore determine whether an attempted common law
marriage is an "illegal or void marriage," the issue of which is legitimated under Section 391.100(2), or whether it is no marriage at all,
which would result in illegitimacy under Section 406.010. A further
part of this problem is whether the "illegal or void marriages," the
issue of which are legitimated by Section 391.100(2), are limited to
the "prohibited and void" marriages enumerated in Section 402.020.
As these questions have never been resolved by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, it would seem appropriate, therefore, to examine
the cases decided under related sections of the statutes and the interpretation of similar statutes in other jurisdictions in order to determine the state of the law.
Due to the paucity of decisions under Section 391.100, it is necessary to look to decisions under Section 391.090, the most closely related
section, to find some indication of the attitude of the court toward the
problem and the probable state of the law regarding it. The decisions
under Section 391.090 are consistent in holding that a ceremonial marriage is required where legitimacy is sought from recognition and
subsequent marriage. The writer has been unable to locate a single
case since the abolition of common law marriage in Kentucky wherein
the court has given any effect to or recognition of an attempted common law marriage contracted in Kentucky. There is a strong possibility that the same reasoning that is used in cases under Section
391.090 would be used by the court to deny legitimacy sought7 under
Section 391.100 to issue of an attempted common law marriage.
7 There are a number of examples of language used by the Court, which indicates its view that only a ceremonial marriage can have a legitimating effect. In
Bates v. Meade, supra note 4, the Court said:
[U]nder our statutes the marriage may be void but the
children, born after the marriage, will be legitimate, if a marriage
was consumated under the forms and ceremonies of the law of the
state ... subject to the exception... (incest and miscegenation)
In the same opinion, the Court quotes and adopts the language of Harris v. Harris,
supra note 6, saying:
The Court then after a reference to section 2098, (now KRS
391.100-Ed. note) providing, in 'part, that "the issue of void marriages shall be legitimate," said Where a marriage actually takes
place, that is, when it is solemnized according to the forms of law..."
Turning now to sections 1398 [now KRS 391.090-Ed. note] and 2098,
[now KRS 391.100-Ed. note] it will be seen that they provide for
two different states of case-one when the child is born before the

NoTEs
Strong arguments to the contrary may be made, however. In the
first place, the problem under Section 391.100 is quite distinguishable
from that under Section 391.090. Since the latter involves legitimatizing children of prior meretricious relationships it is natural that more
scrupulous attention to the legal formalities should be required and
that the subsequent marriage necessary for legitimacy should be held
to contemplate only valid marriages which must be ceremonial. On
the other hand, Section 391.100 states as its purpose the saving of the
legitimacy of issue of void marriages. It is arguable that a child of an
attempted common law marriage should be included among the
legitimated issue of void marriages.
While it must be recognized that the courts have placed heavy emphasis on ceremonial marriage and have consistently refused to permit
an attempted common law marriage to legitimate issue under the
marriage takes place; the other when it is the offspring of a void marriage, but in both sections the legislative intent was the same-to save
the children from iligitimacy if a marriage was solemnized between
the parties.
Bates v. Meade, supra note 4, is an extremely interesting case illustrating the
interplay between sections 891.090 and 391.100. There, several children were
born to a man and woman outside of lawful wedlock prior to a subsequent
ceremonial marriage which was bigamous because of a living undivorced spouse
of one of the parties. Several other children were born to this man and woman
after their bigamous ceremonial marriage. The children born before the marriage were legitimated by the subsequent marriage and recognition by the father
under Section 391.090. Those children born after the marriage, though beyond
help under Section 391.090, which contemplates a marriage subsequent to the
birth of children, were nevertheless held to have been legitimated as children of
a void marriage under the legitimacy saving statute, Section 391.100.
In Helm v. Goin, supra note 4, at 777 Ky., 14 S.W. 2d at 185, an attempted
common law marriage was relied upon to establish legitimacy. If valid, this marriage would have also been bigamous. In holding the attempted common law
marriage insufficient to legitimate, the Court said:
It being admitted that she was not born in lawful wedlock, the
burden was on her to show a subsequent lawful marriage to bring her
within the statute. This under all the evidence, she failed to do. A
mere common-law marriage is not sufficient.
In Todd v. Bowman, 285 Ky. 117, 122, 147 S.W. 2d 75, 78 (1941) an attempt
was made to raise a common law marriage with no impediment. But here the
Court said:
It (the evidence) was, as we view it, of sufficient weight and
quality to overcome the presumption of ceremonial marriage . . .
and) to indicate no more than a common law marriage.
Apparently the Court questioned whether a common law marriage was actually
established under the circumstances, saying: "In this case it may be doubted
whether proof was sufficient to establish a marriage by reputation ... "
The only exception to the Court's refusal to give any effect to a common
law marriage attempted in Kentucky is found in decisions under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 342.080 (1953), which specifies that
"Compensation to any dependent shall cease at the death or legal or common-law
See Gilbert v. Gilbert, 275 Ky. 559, 122 S.W.
marriage of such dependent.
2d 137 (1938); Edgewater Coal Co. v. Yates, 261 Ky. 335, 87 S.W. 2d 596
(1935); Nolan v. Giacomini, 250 Ky. 25, 61 S.W. 2d 1055 (1933); Elkhorn Coal
Corp. v. Tackett, 243 Ky. 694, 49 S.W. 2d 571 (1932).

KENTucKY LAw JouRNAL

statute providing for legitimation by subsequent marriage and recognition (Section 391.090), this is not to say, however, that an attempted
common law marriage might not be permitted to legitimate under the
different provisions of Section 391.100 if uncomplicated by other
factors.
There are strong reasons why such a marriage should legitimate.
An indication that such might be the result is found in Copenhaver v.
Hemphill, where the court said:
We can see no distinction between a void ceremonial
marriage and a void common-law marriage. The intention of the
statute was to protect the innocent victims of these illegal relation-

ships, and with two exceptions . . . [incest and niiscegnation], the
legislature has declared that the issue of void marriage shall be
legitimate.
If appellee's mother and . . . [father] had gone through
a civil ceremony of marriage . . . we think there would be no question of appellee's right to inherit from her father. Instead of doing
this, her parents so conducted themselves as to create the relationship of common-law marriage. While in either case the marriage
would be void, the legislature has declared the issue shall be 8legitimate. The decision of the Chancellor to this effect was correct.
It should be pointed out, however, that the common law marriage in
that case was contracted in Ohio, where such were recognized as
legal, and was void because bigamous. It is believed that the decision
should be the same had the common law marriage been contracted in
Kentucky. Such a result would be in accord with the spirit of the law
and the trend of decisions in other jurisdictions.
Furthermore, the legitimation statute is in derogation of the common law, and Kentucky, contrary to many states, requires by statute a
liberal construction of such acts. 9 In addition, the statute is remedial
in nature and the usual rule, applicable in Kentucky, is that such
statutes are to be liberally construed.
Kentucky has been true to these rules of construction in cases
where bigamy has been involved. 10 At worst, an attempted common
law marriage is a misdemeanor penalized by a fine of from $20 to
$50,11 while bigamy is a felony carrying a penalty of three to nine
year's imprisonment. 12 For the court to legitimate the offspring of the
felonious relationship while bastardizing the issue of the attempted
common law marriage, a mere misdemeanor, would seem an exaggerated premium to place on ceremonial marriage.
8 Supra note 5 at 358, 235 S.W. 2d 779.
9 Ky. RFv. STAT. sec. 446.080(1) (1953).
10 Supra note 4.
11 Ky. REv. STAT. sec.
12

Ky.

REv. STAT.

436.070 (1953).

sec. 436.080 (1953).

NorFs
The children of an attempted common law marriage are surely no
less innocent than those of a bigamous ceremonial union. When even
the issue of a bigamous, common law marriage in a state recognizing
common law marriage is legitimated, 1 by the Kentucky statute, the
same statute should certainly be construed to include the issue of a
simple common law marriage attempted in Kentucky.
The Court of Appeals, in a slightly different but analogous connec14
tion, said in Bates v. Meade:
The full extent to which the legislature has gone in the
effort to save the innocent and punish the guilty may be well illustrated by a comparison of sections 121615 .. .with section 209816
of the statutes. So that if a man who has a wife living from whom
he has not been divorced should marry another woman, he will be
guilty of the crime of bigamy and the marriage be void, yet the
children born of such a marriage will be legitimate.

In addition to the Kentucky cases, which, it is submitted, lay a fair
groundwork for legitimacy in the situation here discussed, there is yet
another source to which we may turn for light. Since the Kentucky
statute is derived directly from an early Virginia statute (the prototype of most American legitimation acts) the interpretation by Virginia courts of the Virginia statute should be of great aid in construction of the Kentucky act. The Virginia act passed in 1785,17 of course,
applied at that time to Kentucky. It said, in part: "The issue in marriage deemed null in law, shall, nevertheless, be legitimate." This
statute became part of the common law of Kentucky in 1792 with the
adoption of the first Constitution.' Then in 1796 the Kentucky legislature passed a statute reenacting verbatim the Virginia act of 1785,19
and the Court of Appeals has said:
. . . From that time to this the idea expressed in the
Act of 1796 has been the statute law of the State, although some
verbal changes have been made in the form of the statute, as may be
seen by a comparison ....

The changes, however, did not affect the

substantial thing intended to be accomplished by the original section.....

20

13 Supra note 5.
14 Supra note 4 at 556, 192 S.W. at 666.
15 Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 436.080 (1958).
1'Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 391.100 (1958).
17 12 LAws OF VmRaIA (Henning 1823) 189-140.
18Ky. CONST. AnT. 8, sec. 6 (First Constitution): "All laws now in force

in the State of Virginia, not consistent (sic.) with this Constitution, which are of
a general nature, and not local to the eastern part of that State, shall be in force
in this State until they shall be altered or repealed by the Legislature."
KY. CONST. SEc. 233: "All laws which, on the first day of June 1792, were
in force in the State of Virginia, and which are of a general nature and not local
to that State, and not repugnant to this Constitution, nor to the laws which have
been enacted by the General Assembly of this Commonwealth, shall be in force
within this State until they shall be altered or repealed by the General Assembly."
19TnE STATUTE LAvw OF KENUcKY 557 (Littell 1810).
20
Bates v. Meade, supra note 4 at 550, 192 S.W. at 668.
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The leading case under the Virginia act of 1785 is Stones v. Keeling.21 This case, decided before the Kentucky act had been judicially
construed, has been followed consistently in Virginia and other States
having similar acts. The immediate question before the court was
legitimation of issue of a bigamous marriage. The opinions by two
eminent jurists took occasion, however, to declare the general spirit
in which this and similar acts have ever since been interpreted.
Judge Tucker,22 in his opinion, says:
[T]he law ought to receive the most liberal construction;
it being evidently the design of the legislature, to establish the most
liberal and extensive rules of succession to estates, in favour of all, in
whose favour the intestate himself, had he made a will, might have
been supposed to be influenced. 23

Judge Roane said, in part:
...[I]f the legislature should ever be supposed to consider every second marriage, living a first husband or wife, as criminal,
wherefore should they visit the sin of the parents on the innocent and
unoffending offspring? But this was not the temper of the legislature.
...
[Tihe children of a man and woman, who afterward intermarry,
if recognized by him, shall be thereby legitimated (New Code, 170
sec. 19.) . . . If the legislature has legalized children begotten in
open fornication, where there is no marriage or semblance of a marriage, it is reasonable presumption that they at the same moment, and
by the same clause ment also to include the offspring of marriages,
which, though void in law, and unfortunate, may be nevertheless
excusable, and even innocent.
It was said . . . that the construction . . . is inadmissable, as
tending to encourage bigamy. It was well said in answer . . . that
considerations of this kind, in relation to the offspring, form no part
of the inducements to marriage:
but this is not all. The legislature
24
itself has given the answer.

That this liberal spirit has continued in the Virginia courts up to the
present is evidenced by McClaugherty v. McClaugherty,2 where, in
determining the legitimacy of issue of an attempted common law marriage, the court said:
... [D]ecisions of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia, and dicta of the distinguished judges of our own Supreme
Court of Appeals, concurred in by the entire court, are each entitled
to much respect. They concur ... to legitimitze the issue of common
215 Call. 143 (Va. 1804).
22 St. George Tucker was successor to the illustrious George Wythe as professor of law at the College of William and Mary when Wythe became Chancellor
of Virginia. Judge Tucker published the first American textbook of law-an edition
of Blackstone's Commentaries, and was for many years prominent among the
leaders of the American bar.
23 Supra note 21 at 144.
24
Supra note 21 at 146-148.
25 180 Va. 51, 21 S.E. 2d 761 (1942).

Noms
law marriages. This construction is supported by sound reasoning
from the Virginia decision. There is no Virginia authority to the
contrary.
To deny the protection of this section to the innocent and
unoffending offspring of common law marriages requires the most
narrow and technical construction of the phrase "marriage deemed
null in law," defeats the intention of the Legislature as determined by our Virginia court, 26and violates the principle of liberal
construction laid down by them.

Since the Kentucky legitimacy saving statute was originally lifted
bodily from the Virginia act it may be assumed that the Kentucky
Legislature intended it to have the same meaning and effect in Kentucky as in Virginia.
Of all Virginia's many children, probably none is so near the parent
in its jurisprudence as West Virginia, the youngest. As the preceding
quotation indicates, the Virginia courts attach great weight to the
decisions of West Virginia courts construing matters of first impression
in Virginia based on common statutes. The legitimation acts of both
West Virginia and Kentucky closely resemble the Virginia statute
and arose from it. Therefore, the interpretation given this statute,
common to these three states, by the West Virginia court should be a
powerful beacon to the Kentucky court in a like situation.
In 1929 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided the
case of Kester v. Kester,27 which is almost exactly in point with the
hypothetical situation to which this note is directed. The legitimacy
of a number of children depended on the sufficiency of an attempted
common law marriage, void in West Virginia, to legitimate by operation of the legitimacy statute. In construing the West Virginia statute,
blood brother of the Kentucky act, the court said:
The case was tried on the theory that the right of these
children to inherit depended upon whether there was a legal mar-

riage of their father and mother according to the statutes of the
state .... But that theory is not controlling of the rights of these in-

fants in this case.
It is quite evident that, even if the marriage was not according to the statutes of this state, it was a common-law marriage.

But it is urgently argued that common-law marriages are not recognized as such in this state. That is quite true, but nevertheless it is a
marriage. It is a marriage which is deemed in law as null and void
and of no effect, so far as the husband and wife are concerned. But
the children, the issue of such marriage, are not bastards.

Our

statute, section 7, chapter 78 of the Code, provides: "The issue of
marriages deemed null in law or dissolved by a court, shall nevertheless be legitimate."
26
Id.at 766.
2
7 106 W. Va. 615, 146 S.E. 625 (1929).
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Stones v. Keeling, supra, has been consistently followed by
In other jurisdictions, where similar
the courts of Virginia ....
given by the
statutes have been passed, the rule of construction
28
Virginia court has been uniformly followed.

Kester v. Kester29 was approved and reaffirmed in 1933 in Fout

v. Hanlin.30 The opinion in that case is of particular interest to this
discussion for the light it throws on the problem of whether the effect
of Section 391.100(2) should be limited to the enumeration found in
Section 402.020. The court said:
The defendants questioned the soundness of the principle
of legitimization laid down in said syllabus and request our reconsideration thereof. It is urged that an attempted common law marriage in this jurisdiction is in reality "no marriage at all" and is not
within the category "deemed null in law" specified in the statute
above quoted. To emphasize this proposition, reference is made to
Code 1931, 48-2-1, wherein there are set forth the various marital
relationships which "shall be void from the time they are so declared
by a decree of nullity." Common law marriages are not included in
the enumeration.
We are of the opinion, however, that in construing the legitimating statute . . . it should not be limited in its application to
null and void marriages enumerated by the statute. ... The legitimating statute, founded in benevolence and charity, has for its design the protection of innocent offspring. Humanitarian principles
require that the statute be liberally construed to effectuate its benign purpose. Many of the States of the American Union recognize
the validity of common-law marriage contracted within their borders.
And, a State which does not permit common-law marriages therein
will give full recognition to such marriages when deemed legal in
the State where contracted. In the light of this situation, we cannot
hold, as insisted by defendants, that it is the legislative intent in this
jurisdiction that a common law marriage attempted to be consummated in this State should be "no marriage at all." We think it is
null in law" within the purview of the legitimiza marriage "deemed
31
ing statute, supra.
28 Id. at 626, 627. See also: Re Henry Shipp's Estate, 168 Cal. 640, 144 P.
143 (1914): "The appellant seeks to give this clause (identical to the Virginia
and West Virginia statutes) a very limited interpretation- his contention being
that the term 'marriages null in law,' as here used, includes only the marriages
which are subject to an action for annulment on one of the grounds specified ...
We think the provision should not be construed so narrowly. The statute was
passed with the generous and kindly purpose of relieving children, to some extent,
from the harsh consequences of illegitimacy-a status for which the children affected are in no degree morally responsible. The section should be liberally construed." See also Darling v. Dent, 82 Ark. 76, 100 S.W. 747 (1907).
29 Supra note 27.
30 113 W. Va. 752, 169 S.E. 743 (1933).
31 Id. at 169 S.E. 744. W. VA. CoDE Chap. 78 sec. 7 (1931), now Section
4701(1). This section is roughly comparable to Ky. REv. STAT. see. 402.020 and
lists a number of conditions existing which make marriages void. It should be
pointed out, however, that the Kentucky Statute purports to make a number of
marriages" void without a decree of annulment whereas under West Virginia
procedure a judicial determination of invalidity is necessary and a plea of a void
marriage must be based on a decree of nullity. See W. VA. CoDn ANN. sees.
4701, 4702, and 4086 (1955).
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The Supreme Court of Maryland, in Milton v. Escue,32 very recently made these interesting and apropos comments on Kentucky and
Virginia decisions and statutes:
...We think the law of Virginia to be that ... [facts
raising a common law marriage] that [such] marriage, equally with
a void ceremonial marriage, is one "deemed null in law" by the Virginia statute and its courts, and therefore one which makes the issue
of the couple legitimate, whether ante-nati or post-nati. See also
Campbell v. Allen, 208 Ga. 274, 66 S.E. 2nd 226 and Copenhaver v.
Hemphill, 314 Ky. 356, 235 S.W. 2nd 778, 779, in which the Georgia
and Kentucky courts in construing legitimation statutes similar to the
Virginia statutes, found that common law marriages, equally with
ceremonial marriages, were sufficient to satisfy the statutes. In each
case, the court said, "We can see no distinction between
a void ceremonial marriage and a void common law marriage." 33

In conclusion, in no Kentucky case has the hypothesized situation
been squarely before the court. With all the strong emphasis on the
necessity of a ceremonial marriage to legitimate children previously
born, there is nothing as yet in the Kentucky decisions that would
necessarily obviate a result like that attained by West Virginia in
Kester v. Kester, or by Virginia in McClaugherty v. McClaugherty
under virtually identical statutes, The door to legitimation of children
of an attempted common law marriage, though not open wide, is not
closed. The language in cases already decided is such that, sholld a
case arise, the court would be at a crossroad. Either result, legitimacy
or bastardy, could logically be reached.
It is submitted that Section 402.020(4) contemplates attempted
common law marriages, possibly with other situations, in the list of
"prohibited and void" marriages. Therefore, the attempted common
law marriage clearly does not fall in the category of meretricious relationships which are no marriage at all and the issue are legitimate
by virtue of Section 391.100(2). If, however, it were to be held that
an attempted common law marriage is not included in the enumeration
of "prohibited and void" marriages found in Section 402.020, it is farther submitted that the legitimating effect of Section 391.100(2) is
not limited to those situdtions found in that enumeration but applies
to the issue of any attempted but void marriage not specifically excluded by Section 391.100(1). Such a result is in accord with the
spirit of the legitimacy saving statute, the decisions in other States,
and the general trend and avowed policy of the Kentucky courts "to
34
declare children legitimate when it can be fairly done."
JA2,ms FRANcs Mrum
32261 Md. 190, 93 A. 2d 258 (1952).
33 Id.at 93 A. 2d 262.
34

Stein's Admr. v. Stein, 42 Ky. Law Rep. 664, 106 S.W. 860 (1908).

